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Liu Yazhou, a general in the People’s Liberation Army once wrote that Central Asia is “the thickest piece of cake given to the modern 
Chinese by the heavens.”1 Over the past three 
decades, China has sought to take advantage of 
its strategic location next to Central Asia and its 
influence in the region has grown dramatically. 
China’s relationship with Central Asia is strongly 
influenced by its policies and aspirations concerning 
the western province of Xinjiang. The province 
borders three of the five Central Asian states and 
its largest ethnic group, the Uighurs, share a Turkic 
heritage and Muslim religion with many Central 
Asians.2 As the Chinese government has tried to 
integrate Xinjiang into the rest of the country to 
establish that it is more cohesively a part of China, 
the province has been beset by tensions between 
the native Uighur population and Han migrants.3 In 
2013, the Chinese government announced the “New 
Silk Road,” a grand scheme to develop inter-Asian 
transportation and trade routes, a large portion of 
which run through Xinjiang and Central Asia. An 
article by Wu Jianmin, former president of the China 
Foreign Affairs University, described the project as 
“the most significant and far-reaching initiative that 
China has ever put forward.”4 Due to the unstable 
situation in Xinjiang, the New Silk Road, unlike 
many other instances of Chinese investment abroad, 
is likely to have a direct domestic impact in China. 
Through the New Silk Road, the Chinese 
government hopes to achieve three main goals: to 
increase its access to energy resources in Central 
Asia, to open new markets for Chinese goods 
through the construction of infrastructure and thus 
offset some excess industrial and manufacturing 
capacity, and to promote stability in Xinjiang. The 
Chinese government has previously used economic 
development in Xinjiang and expansion of trade 
with Central Asia in attempts to quell ethnic unrest 
through improvements in living standards. 
This paper argues that new efforts to bring 
Central Asian states into China’s sphere of influence 
through investment and trade can be seen as an 
extension of past development efforts undertaken 
by the Chinese government in Xinjiang. While 
China has successfully collaborated with Central 
Asian states to increase its influence and achieve its 
security aims, expanding its economic relations with 
the region poses additional challenges. While the 
New Silk Road has the potential to bring a number 
of benefits to the region, I argue that, based on the 
resentment generated by certain past projects and 
the similarities between these projects and those 
proposed under the new initiative, it also presents 
risks that run counter to the Chinese government’s 
goal of promoting regional and interethnic stability. 
To support this argument, this paper first traces 
the evolution of the Chinese government’s policies 
in Xinjiang and Central Asia over the past twenty-
five years, focusing on the connections between 
the two sets of policies and successful diplomatic 
strategies employed. The discussion then shifts to 
the use of economic development to address ethnic 
tensions in Xinjiang and how the New Silk Road 
grows out of this effort. An overview of the key 
components of China’s economic relationship with 
Central Asia and how the New Silk Road will affect 
each component is then given. Reactions to Chinese 
economic involvement in the region are important 
for understanding the prospects of the New Silk 
Road. Theoretical arguments demonstrate how 
different interest groups are expected to respond 
when increased trade, migration, and investment 
occur, with a particular emphasis on which groups 
may be opposed. This paper will utilize case studies 
of both Xinjiang and Central Asia to examine the 
actual effects of investment and migration. In each 
of the two case studies, the paper will first discuss 
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current reactions and then provide an analysis of 
how the local populations may respond to the New 
Silk Road. Finally, the ethical implications of regional 
development are discussed. 
I. THE NEW SILK ROAD INITIATIVE
The New Silk Road refers to a foreign policy 
initiative that encompasses far more than just China’s 
economic relationship with Central Asia. The Chi-
nese government now refers to the initiative “one 
belt, one road,” since it comprises both the “New Silk 
Road Economic Belt,” which covers land routes from 
China through Central Asia, and the “21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road,” which covers sea lanes running 
through Southeast Asia. In September 2013, Presi-
dent Xi Jinping launched the Silk Road Economic 
Belt during a speech at Nazarbayev University in 
Astana, Kazakhstan. The following month, he an-
nounced the Maritime Silk Road in Jakarta, Indo-
nesia (for simplicity, the references to the New Silk 
Road in this paper refer only to the “economic belt” 
portion).5 
The Silk Road Economic Belt will include a 
network of railways, pipelines, and roads to facilitate 
the movement of goods and resources. A joint state-
ment from China’s National Development Reform 
Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the 
Ministry of Commerce in 2015 outlined seven of the 
project’s specific objectives. These were: constructing 
and upgrading infrastructure, expanding market ac-
cess, reducing customs and trade barriers, cooperat-
ing on natural resources, deepening financial ties, 
encouraging cultural and educational exchanges, and 
using multilateral economic forums.6 Among these 
objectives, cooperation on natural resources and 
improving regional infrastructure are particularly 
important in Central Asia.7 The Silk Road Economic 
Belt, is projected to be completed by 2025 and to 
begin in Xi’an, the historic terminus of the Silk Road 
pass through the Chinese cities of Lanzhou and 
Urumqi, and then continue into Central Asia, the 
Middle East, and Europe.8 
Many commentators cite the New Silk Road as 
evidence of the Xi administration’s effort to reassert 
China’s historic role in the region and counter the 
influence of the United States.9 In 2012, a professor 
at Peking University, Wang Jisi, advocated for a 
“March West” strategy in which China would move 
into the areas of Central and South Asia from 
which the United States was withdrawing as the 
war in Afghanistan wound down.10 From this view, 
one could see increased connectivity in the region 
through economic and infrastructural ties as a 
foundation for creating a pan-Asian community led 
by China.11 Some have gone so far as to compare the 
project to a reestablishment of the vassal relationships 
in China’s past, while others have characterized it 
“as a Marshall Plan with Chinese characteristics.”12 
Chinese officials, however, vehemently deny any 
similarities between the two plans. When asked 
whether the New Silk Road followed the model of 
the Marshall Plan, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi responded, “It [‘Belt and road’] is a product of 
inclusive cooperation, not a tool of geopolitics, and 
must not be viewed with the outdated Cold War 
mentality”.13 
The New Silk Road will be financed by a com-
bination of Chinese government entities and multi-
lateral institutions backed by China. Beijing has ap-
proved $40 billion specifically for a Silk Road Fund to 
finance the project, in addition to funding that will be 
supplied by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) and bilateral loans.14 The Silk Road Fund will 
receive capital from government bodies including the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange, the China 
Investment Corporation (China’s sovereign wealth 
fund), the China Export-Import Bank, and the China 
Development Bank.15 Many of these institutions 
have played an active part in previous Chinese for-
eign development projects. In addition to the fund-
ing provided directly by the Chinese government, 
Chinese firms, some of which are also state-owned 
enterprises, are also investing in the region as part of 
the New Silk Road.16 The project will similarly allow 
companies in China to draw on extensive experi-
ence with domestic infrastructure construction and 
apply it abroad.17 A number of commentators have 
also cited, “one belt, one road” as a way for China to 
address domestic excess capacity by providing new 
opportunities for firms abroad. However, the degree 
to which the initiative can help absorb excess capacity 
is unclear, and the new projects may play only a small 
role in increasing demand for Chinese products.18
The multilateral nature of the projects in the 
New Silk Road has led China to take a somewhat dif-
ferent approach to the initiative’s funding than in past 
projects. Chinese officials have said that the Silk Road 
Fund will be more open to the opinions and invest-
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ments of outside nations and firms.19 The head state 
risk analyst of the China Export-Import Bank said 
that each decision made by the fund must be based 
on a consensus among the various parties involved. 
These changes are attributed to the dependency of the 
projects on cooperation from other governments.20 
China’s grand aspirations for the New Silk Road 
have led members of the Western media to express 
concern about shifting power relations in the region. 
In particular, the involvement of China-led institu-
tions, such as the AIIB, raises questions about how 
China will use its increased geopolitical influence. 
The New Silk Road will also have significant effects 
on the economies of Xinjiang and Central Asia. 
II. CHINESE POLICY IN XINJIANG AND ITS 
EFFECT ON CENTRAL ASIA
 The motivations guiding the New Silk 
Road strategy can best be understood through an 
analysis of China’s policies in Xinjiang and how the 
Chinese government’s troubled history with Xinjiang 
influences its relationship with Central Asia. For 
China, political and economic ties with Central Asia 
are instrumental for ensuring stability in Xinjiang, 
as the province borders Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Mongolia. This section 
will describe how China’s political relations with 
Xinjiang and Central Asia have evolved, including 
the increased emphasis placed on regional trade 
and multilateral institutions such as the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization. 
a. Policies in Xinjiang Prior to the 1990s
Xinjiang was conquered by China in 1759 
during the Qing Dynasty. During this period, China 
was developing a more cohesive sense of national 
character, and the province was managed with 
repressive tactics.21 At the time, Russia and Great 
Britain were competing for influence in Central 
Asia as part of the “Great Game,” and China wanted 
to assert its own interests in the region as well.22 
Han Chinese slowly began moving to the province 
during the Qing Dynasty, starting a long history 
of using migration to promote assimilation in 
Xinjiang. 23 Tensions between Han Chinese and the 
Uighurs grew over the subsequent two centuries. 
Although Xinjiang experienced three brief periods of 
independence during the twentieth century, the last 
of these ended with the unification of the country 
under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 
1949.24
The CCP’s rule of Xinjiang differed from those 
of previous governments. In the three decades after 
1949, the Chinese government sought to integrate 
Xinjiang into the rest of China using Maoist ideology 
and new political and economic structures.25 Much 
of the government’s focus was on using improved 
infrastructure and communication networks to 
strengthen ties. The CCP also adopted harsher 
policies towards the Uighurs partly due to “a fear of 
concentrated ethnic groups.”26 Despite improvements 
in physically integrating Xinjiang with the rest 
of China, many residents did not feel socially or 
politically integrated into the state and retained their 
historical and cultural ties to Central Asia. 
The Chinese government sought to further 
isolate Xinjiang from non-Chinese groups and beliefs 
following the Sino-Soviet split in 1960. During 
this period, the Chinese government pursued a 
policy of trying to “re-orient Xinjiang ‘inward’ 
toward China proper,” rather than permitting its 
traditional outward orientation toward Central Asia 
because most of that region was now controlled 
by the Soviet Union.27 As a result, there was little 
formal trade across the border.28 Such a shift was 
designed in part to prevent Xinjiang from coming 
under the ideological sway of the Soviet Union.29 
To achieve this, the Chinese government attempted 
to weaken existing cultural ties through efforts 
such as encouraging Han migration, reforming the 
Uighur script, and limiting economic and political 
connections with Central Asia.30
b. Changes in Xinjiang and Central Asian Policies 
During the 1990s
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
Chinese government became increasingly worried 
about instability in Xinjiang, and its concerns were 
magnified by unrest that began in the province in 
the early 1990s. According to M. Taylor Fravel, a 
professor at MIT who has written extensively on 
China’s territorial disputes, the Baren Uprising, 
which occurred in southern Xinjiang in April 1990, 
“sparked a decade of ethnic unrest and instability in 
Xinjiang that challenged the regime’s authority in 
this vast frontier.”31 During the Baren Uprising alone, 
between 2,000 and 3,000 Uighurs died in skirmishes 
with the Chinese police.32 After new states were 
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established in Central Asia in 1991, Chinese leaders 
worried that the Uighurs too might now demand 
their own independent state.33 Indeed, as “Uighurs 
saw their cousins in Central Asia found sovereign 
states…resistance to Chinese rule exploded.”34 
The unrest during this period took the form of 
demonstrations, terrorist activities, and fighting 
between insurgent groups and the government.35
Uighur political organizations in Central 
Asia particularly worried the Chinese government. 
Many of the Uighur groups that advocated for a 
free “Uighurstan” or “East Turkestan” during the 
1990s operated out of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Officials feared that movements organized in these 
nations would travel across the border and take root 
domestically.36 Many of these groups argued for a 
secular democracy established through nonviolence, 
but some promoted a more violent ideology.37 
Chinese leaders were also concerned that Islamist 
movements in Afghanistan and Central Asia would 
spread into Xinjiang.38
To gain the assistance of Central Asian 
governments in cracking down on Uighur separatist 
and Islamic movements, Chinese leaders took a 
concessionary approach to border disputes.39 After 
the Soviet Union fell, China had to settle outstanding 
border disputes with the new nations of Tajikistan, 
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.40 Border agreements 
that China signed with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan 
in 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1998 were precipitated by 
violence in Xinjiang and all helped China to achieve 
the outcomes of strengthened security, expanded 
trade, and the cessation of support to Uighurs abroad. 
41 As a result, throughout the 1990s, China was 
able to place “immense but discrete pressure on the 
Central Asian governments, in particular Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, over their Uighur diaspora.”42 This 
pressure was exerted primarily through provisions 
that discouraged these nations from providing 
assistance—financial or otherwise—to Uighur 
political movements.
The 1990s thus represented the beginning of 
Central Asia’s special role as a region that was central 
to achieving three of China’s interests: preserving 
stability on its borders, quelling Uighur separatism, 
and ensuring access to energy resources.43 These 
three interests continue to underlie Chinese foreign 
policy in the region and to motivate the New Silk 
Road. 
c. Economic Relations with Central Asia during the 
1990s 
In addition to the political tools used to 
strengthen relations with Central Asian nations, the 
Chinese government also began employ the opening 
of trade relations with the region as a means for 
achieving stability during the 1990s. The border 
between Xinjiang and Central Asia had been closed 
for trade after the Sino-Soviet split. Even when trade 
reopened in 1983, the level of cross-border trade was 
low.44 However, the leadership in Beijing believed 
that, “with the necessary economic development, 
infrastructure upgrades, and legal environment 
(especially reducing corruption), the region could 
potentially provide a critical economic partner for 
Xinjiang and, over the long run, a direct portal for 
the Western province to the outside world.”45 The 
Chinese government hoped that opening up to 
Central Asia would improve the political situation 
in Xinjiang, which would then establish a suitable 
environment for economic development to take 
place.46 This led to a “double-opening” in which 
Xinjiang was opened up to both the rest of China and 
to Central Asia, a process that continues today.47
Increased Chinese economic interest in Central 
Asia coincided with a broader shift in the expansion 
of Chinese foreign investment. As early as 1994, the 
Chinese Premier Li Peng called for the establishment 
of a New Silk Road that would travel from China 
to the Middle East through Central Asia.48 Such an 
initiative would open new markets and allow China 
greater access to energy resources.49 During the late 
1990s, under the leadership of President Jiang Zemin 
and Premier Zhu Rongji, the government exhorted 
Chinese firms to “go out” (走出去) and by extension 
to “go global”(走向世界).50 State-owned enterprises, 
particularly energy companies, quickly adopted this 
policy and eyed markets in Central Asia as well as 
other parts of the world.51 
China’s economic turn outward in the 1990s 
coincided with the government’s development of 
a more Asia-focused foreign policy. During this 
period, the principles of trying to “establish good 
neighborliness, make neighbors prosperous, and 
make them feel secure” guided China’s relations with 
states on its periphery.52 China sought to engage with 
Central Asia multilaterally in a manner consistent 
with a “peaceful rise.”53
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d. The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization 
One of the main mechanisms through which 
China has sought to engage in multilateral diplomacy 
and increase its influence in Central Asia is the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO 
was founded in 2001 and grew out of the “Shanghai 
Five,” a group of states settling border disputes 
in the 1990s.54 Its members now include China, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Russia.55 
The Chinese government has been adept 
at shaping the agenda of the SCO to promote 
its own interests, particularly those related to 
domestic stability.56 The organization has facilitated 
cooperation on security issues, including efforts 
to combat what China deems the “three evils” of 
extremism, terrorism, and separatism through 
the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure.57 It is also 
an important body for facilitating cultural and 
diplomatic ties, and leaders of member states meet 
regularly for summits.58 China houses the SCO’s 
headquarters and maintains a strong leadership role 
in the organization.59 
The SCO has been less successful, however, 
in promoting collaboration on economic projects 
despite China’s desire for the body to do so.60 
Although the SCO announced in 2003 that it 
would increase its emphasis on economic issues, 
progress has been limited.61 Most of the investments 
supposedly made by the SCO have actually been 
provided by China.62 China has been the sole 
source of funding for joint economic undertakings, 
providing $900 million in loans to SCO nations in 
2004 and $10 billion in 2010.63 Zhao Huasheng, a 
Chinese expert on Central Asia and Russia wrote: 
“China is undoubtedly the locomotive for economic 
cooperation in the SCO,” but that “it seems not all of 
China’s expectations [of the SCO] have been fulfilled, 
especially economically.” 64
 Ultimately, China seeks to develop a free 
trade zone and an improved transportation network 
between SCO members to encourage economic 
integration and regional stability.65 The Chinese 
government has repeatedly stressed the importance 
of developing strong infrastructure connections 
between SCO countries. As early as 2003 at the SCO 
summit in Moscow, President Hu Jintao stated, 
“Taking into account the reality of the region, 
China suggests economic cooperation begin with 
transportation.”66 Some transportation and business 
advancements have been made, but Russian worries 
that this might threaten the expansion of the Russian-
led Eurasian Economic Union have stymied progress 
toward a regional free trade zone.67 Zhao argues that 
given the situation, China must take intermediate 
steps to work towards a regional free trade zone.68 
The construction of the New Silk Road will 
facilitate some of these intermediate steps by enabling 
the Chinese government to promote integration 
through transportation and to push toward a free 
trade zone on its own. Recent signs of cooperation 
between those involved in the SCO and the Silk Road 
Initiative have also emerged. In March 2015, the 
government-affiliated news agency Xinhua reported, 
“The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will 
combine national development strategies with the 
China-proposed Silk Road Economic Belt initiative 
and work for deeper involvement in global affairs.”69 
China’s pursuit of a multilateral economic strategy in 
the region appears to be moving forward, but many 
of its economic ties in Central Asia remain bilateral.
III. THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
IN XINJIANG 
Economic development is an important pillar 
of the Chinese government’s approach to reducing 
interethnic tensions in Xinjiang and complements 
the political activities discussed in section II. 
This section will explore the origins of China’s 
developmental approach in the province and how 
the Chinese government’s commitment to economic 
development in Xinjiang has taken on a circular 
pattern. Development is seen as critical to ensuring 
stability, but stability is also seen as a requirement 
for development.70 The importance of providing 
investment to Xinjiang was reaffirmed by the 
“Develop the West” campaign and will continue with 
the New Silk Road. 
a. Development Policy in Xinjiang Prior to the 2000s 
Beginning in the late 1970s, economic 
development took on a greater role in the Chinese 
government’s policies toward Xinjiang, consistent 
with the general shift toward economic reform and 
opening occurring in China at that time.71 The 
Chinese government began to adopt a less isolationist 
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approach to the province and to see Xinjiang as 
both a buffer area and a region with strategic and 
economic assets that could increase China’s stature.72 
Xinjiang comprises one-sixth of China’s land 
territory and possesses a quarter of the nation’s oil 
and gas, as well as extensive coal reserves. Thus, it 
has the potential to contribute significantly to the 
economy.73 The shift toward a strategy more focused 
on economic development in Xinjiang included 
greater investment in the energy sector, attempts 
to centralize economic policy, the establishment of 
inland “ports” for trade bordering Central Asia, and 
more spending on infrastructure.74 However, even 
as the focus shifted toward economic development, 
aspects of policy from previous eras remained. These 
included Han migration and a strong role for the 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, a 
government body focused largely on local agriculture 
and infrastructure.75
The Chinese government has often paired 
economic development policies with strict 
crackdowns in the wake of violent outbursts in 
Xinjiang. In the 1990s, President Jiang Zemin 
explained that development was to “maintain the 
unity of ethnic groups, national unification and 
social stability.”76 The Chinese government attributes 
the instability in Xinjiang to low incomes. Thus, 
by raising the standard of living, it can reduce 
resentment toward government policies.77 Even 
though Xinjiang’s GDP growth began to rise during 
the 1990s, the gap between per capita incomes 
in Xinjiang and those in coastal cities remained 
substantial. For example, in the late 1990s, the 
per capita GDP in Xinjiang (6,229 RMB) was 
approximately one-third that of Beijing (18,482 
RMB).78 New outbreaks in hostilities in the province 
in 1996 led to additional initiatives to boost the local 
economy and promote stability. These initiatives were 
included in the Ninth Five-Year plan (1996-2000), 
which discussed the importance of developing “pillar 
industries” in Xinjiang in petroleum, petrochemicals, 
and cotton.79
b. The “Develop the West” Policy 
Economic development initiatives in Xinjiang 
intensified when the Chinese government undertook 
the “Develop the West” campaign (西部大开发) to 
reduce regional disparities in standards of living.80 
Launched in March 2000, Develop the West (also 
known as the Great Western Development campaign) 
was implemented across China. The campaign 
included provisions to develop Xinjiang into “an 
industrial and agricultural base and a trade and 
energy corridor for the national economy.”81 The 
“Develop the West” campaign produced significant 
nationwide investment, including $190 billion in 
2007 and $64 billion in 2008 and 2009. While it is 
difficult to separate the exact amount of spending by 
province, since many of the infrastructure projects 
were inter-regional, the comparatively large and 
restive provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet received 
substantial investment. In Xinjiang specifically, much 
of the investment went towards the construction of 
telecommunications infrastructure and roads, as 
well as toward developing Xinjiang’s oil reserves and 
finding ways to connect the province to other oil 
exporters.82 
During the campaign, Chinese officials reiter-
ated their commitment to resolving internal stability 
challenges in Xinjiang through development. In 2000, 
the head of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Li 
Dezhu, stated, “The strategy to promote social and 
economic development of western China is a funda-
mental way to speed up the development of minority 
nationalities, and a necessary choice to solve China’s 
nationality problems under new historical circum-
stances.”83 The various components of “Develop the 
West,” particularly its infrastructure projects, contin-
ued previous attempts to join Xinjiang more tightly 
to other parts of the country.84
Beijing has continued to invest in infrastructure 
and development in Xinjiang. In 2010, the govern-
ment issued a roadmap to spur “leapfrog develop-
ment” in the province with the aim of raising per cap-
ita incomes in the province to national levels in five 
years.85 The roadmap came in the wake of protests 
that killed 197 people and injured 1,700.86 As a result 
of these development programs, in recent years, the 
province’s economy has consistently grown at a rate 
of 10 percent or higher, roughly 3 percent faster than 
the national average.87
c. Xinjiang’s Role in the New Silk Road 
An analysis of the domestic provisions of the 
New Silk Road shows that the initiative is guided 
by a similar logic to that which underlies the 
“Develop the West” campaign. The Vice-Director 
of the State Information Center’s World Economic 
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Research Bureau, Zhang Monan, explained that the 
domestically focused “Develop the West” policy 
evolved to be more international and broader in 
scope.88 Through both the Central and Southeast 
Asian components of the New Silk Road, $16.3 
billion will be provided specifically for domestic 
infrastructure projects in twenty provincial regions 
of China.89 Previous road and rail construction was 
undertaken to deepen links between Xinjiang and 
the rest of the country. 90 That pattern is now being 
extended with rail construction to China’s neighbors 
to achieve a similar aspiration of using infrastructure 
to improve political and economic ties.
Just as in the “Develop the West” campaign, 
one of the Chinese government’s domestic aims 
for the New Silk Road is to create more balance 
between the economies of the nation’s eastern and 
western provinces.91 An article in Xinhua stated that 
the initiative will allow “more parts of the country 
to enjoy the benefits of its opening-up policy,” and 
enable China “to integrate domestic and regional 
development.”92 Just as China’s coastal provinces 
improved their economies by receiving greater 
foreign investment and becoming hubs for trade, the 
Chinese government hopes that the New Silk Road 
will bring similar opportunities to Xinjiang and other 
parts of western China.93
The New Silk Road will significantly impact 
Xinjiang’s economy. Seventy percent of trade between 
China and Central Asia already passes through Xin-
jiang, and with the New Silk Road, the value and vol-
ume of this trade will increase.94 Additionally, more 
than $300 billion has already been invested, largely by 
state-owned enterprises, on new projects in sectors 
including construction, energy, and technology. The 
provincial government has also begun to upgrade 
transportation infrastructure.95 Roads and railways 
built to conduct goods to and from Central Asia will 
pass through the province, and many of the oil and 
gas pipelines originating in Central Asia terminate 
in Xinjiang.96 The hope is that through the New Silk 
Road, Xinjiang’s economy will expand to include 
more tourism, manufacturing, and services. The New 
Silk Road may also increase exports from Xinjiang 
and other parts of western China to Central Asian 
markets.97 Finally, the provincial capital, Urumqi, 
aspires to become a financial center for trade between 
China, Central Asia, and the Middle East.98 
The projected development associated with the 
New Silk Road is already changing Xinjiang’s urban 
landscape. New economic centers, where companies 
will enjoy favorable tax regimes and other services, 
have been announced in the province.99 The city of 
Horgos, situated on the border between China and 
Kazakhstan, was already an established inland port, 
but has recently drawn media attention due to new 
investment under from the Silk Road Economic Belt. 
Horgos has become a departure point for goods-
laden trains headed to Central Asia and Europe and 
boasts China’s first cross-border free trade area. Be-
tween 2013 and 2014 alone, Horgos’ revenue grew by 
80 percent. 100 In coming years, the city is predicted 
to expand to one hundred times its current size, 
while its population and number of businesses are 
expected to go up tenfold over the next ten years.101 
Horgos is just one of many cities in Xinjiang expected 
to benefit from the New Silk Road, but since it is 
already at an advanced stage of development, it is 
often touted as an example of what the government’s 
economic policies and engagement with Central Asia 
can achieve for the province’s economy.
IV. CHINA’S ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH 
CENTRAL ASIA 
Chinese trade with and through Central Asia is 
an important part of the New Silk Road. This section 
will examine the key dimensions of China’s economic 
relationships with Central Asian states, including 
the export of manufactured goods, import of natural 
resources, and construction of infrastructure. 
Analyzing these trade dynamics elucidates what 
China hopes to achieve economically through the 
New Silk Road. 
China has taken over Russia’s historic role and 
become the largest trading partner for most Central 
Asian states. Between 2000 and 2012, China’s trade 
with the region grew from $1.8 billion to $46 billion, 
according the Chinese Ministry of Commerce.102 The 
number of Chinese companies operating in Central 
Asia has also expanded.103 China’s presence in 
Central Asian economies has become so large that an 
estimated 70 to 80 percent of goods sold in Kazakh 
markets originate in China.104 
a. Export of Manufactured Goods 
 Manufactured products are an important part 
of China’s trade with Central Asia. Finished goods 
such as textiles, electronics, and other consumer 
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items make up 80 to 90 percent of China’s exports 
to Central Asia.105 Although the arrival of these 
products threatens local manufacturing capabilities 
(discussed later in the paper), it also creates new 
opportunities for Central Asians to engage in 
transportation, re-export, and other services.106 
Kyrgyzstan, the only member of the World Trade 
Organization in Central Asia, is particularly open 
to the arrival of Chinese goods.107 It has become 
a center for the re-export of Chinese products in 
Central Asia, as it imports Chinese products and 
then exports them to other states. Marlene Laruelle 
and Sebastien Peyrouse, professors at the Elliott 
School of International Affairs at George Washington 
University, estimate that re-exports in Kyrgyzstan 
are equal in value to the nation’s entire economy 
and provide a key means for accessing foreign 
currency.108 
b. Import of Natural Resources 
Another critical aspect of China’s trade 
relationship with Central Asia is its desire to access 
natural resources to meet its growing energy 
demands. China is already the biggest global 
consumer of energy, and its demands for both oil 
and natural gas are projected to grow over the next 
two decades.109 China currently relies on imports 
to meet more than half of its energy needs. While 
approximately 47 percent of these imports come 
from the Middle East, an increasing portion comes 
from Central Asia.110
 Central Asian nations are rich in resources 
that, advantageously, can also be transported to 
China overland rather than by sea. Kazakhstan 
contains 1 percent of the world’s natural gas and 2 
percent of the world’s oil supply, and Turkmenistan 
contains nearly 10 percent of the world’s natural 
gas supply.111 A number of Chinese state-owned 
enterprises have invested in the Central Asian 
energy market since 1997, including the China 
National Petroleum Company (CNPC), Sinopec, 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation, China 
International Trust and Investment Corporation, and 
Sinochem.112 
China has its most significant energy 
relationship in Central Asia with Kazakhstan. As 
of 2010, Chinese companies controlled 23 percent 
of Kazakhstan’s overall oil output, the biggest stake 
China holds in any oil-exporting nation.113 The 
Sino-Kazakh pipeline opened in 2006, and by 
2011, it provided China with ten million tons of oil 
annually.114 This comprised approximately 5 percent 
of China’s oil needs at the time.115 This project was 
China’s first cross-border pipeline and was jointly 
undertaken by the CNPC and the Kazakh firm 
KazMunaiGaz.116 China also uses pipelines through 
Kazakhstan to gain access to oil from Kazakhstan 
and areas near the Caspian and Black Seas.117 
 Chinese firms have also invested in 
resources in other parts of Central Asia. The China-
Central Asia pipeline was completed in 2009, and 
by December 2011, it was transporting 65 billion 
cubic meters of gas to China from Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.118 The China 
Development Bank provided the loan for the 
pipeline’s construction and supported the purchase of 
a certain amount of the pipeline’s gas, the profits from 
which initially went toward repayment of the loan.119 
China has also invested in hydropower projects in 
Kazakhstan and proposed projects in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan with the objective of providing electricity 
to Xinjiang.120 
Consistent with China’s previous economic 
engagement with Central Asia, the New Silk Road 
will focus heavily on expanding China’s access 
to energy resources. The vice-director of China’s 
National Energy Administration has stated that 
energy is “the centerpiece of the New Silk Road 
economic belt plan,” and Chinese state-owned 
enterprises are expected to increase their investment 
as a result.121 The Chinese government is particularly 
interested in the continued construction of overland 
pipelines in light of increasing tensions in the South 
and East China Seas.122 
c. Construction of Infrastructure 
 In addition to China’s extensive investments 
in Central Asian energy, much of its influence in the 
region comes from investments in infrastructure 
and technology.123 Elizabeth Economy and Michael 
Levi of the Council on Foreign Relations argue that 
because Chinese leaders are able “to coordinate bids 
that combine subsidized infrastructure projects and 
access to natural resource deposits [this] creates a 
win-win situation for both construction companies 
and resource companies.”124 China will often provide 
low-interest rate loans or grants to countries that its 
firms are hoping to enter. The government’s ability 
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to provide such assistance and to subsidize state-
owned enterprises provides Chinese energy and 
construction firms with an edge by lowering the 
costs of accessing the resources or enabling Chinese 
companies to outbid other firms. 125 
In addition to infrastructure for energy, the 
Chinese government has also financed a robust 
transportation network in Central Asia, with a 
particular focus on connections to Xinjiang. Between 
2002 and 2011, China spent millions of dollars on 
building highways in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
and a rail project connecting cities in Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Xinjiang.126 The New Silk Road 
follows this pattern with its emphasis on increasing 
the physical integration of Xinjiang with Central Asia 
and the Middle East. 
With the New Silk Road, China will also expand 
the infrastructure networks it has already established 
in Central Asia and use them as a conduit for 
increasing trade with larger markets such as Turkey, 
Russia, and Iran.127 Additionally, since China’s largest 
trading partner is the European Union, there is 
strong interest in ensuring that goods can be shipped 
to Europe as efficiently as possible.128 The rail lines 
constructed as part of the Silk Road Economic Belt 
will allow a greater number of containers to travel by 
land instead of by sea.129 Although trains are unlikely 
to entirely replace ships as a means for transporting 
goods—since they can hold fewer containers and 
are more costly—for higher value products such as 
electronics, shipping by train may prove worthwhile 
to ensure earlier arrivals.130 
V. MODELS FOR TRADE AND MIGRATION 
BETWEEN CHINA AND CENTRAL ASIA
The growth in trade and investment ties 
between Central Asia, Xinjiang, and other parts of 
China has affected local economic structures and 
demographics. Exploring these effects with both 
theoretical models and empirical evidence deepens 
an understanding of how China’s economic presence 
is perceived in the region and what reactions the New 
Silk Road is likely to provoke. 
a. The Effects of Trade 
As discussed above, there is a clear divide in 
the types of goods that China and Central Asian 
states import and export from one another. The 
Stolper-Samuelson model can help explain these 
trade patterns. This fundamental model for trade 
dynamics considers two states, state A and state B, 
both of which are endowed with labor and capital as 
factors of production. If in state A, labor is relatively 
plentiful and capital is relatively scant, and in state 
B, the reverse is true (labor is scant and capital 
plentiful), then we expect that producing labor-
intensive goods will be relatively cheap in state A, 
but expensive in state B. Similarly, producing capital-
intensive goods will be relatively cheap in state B, but 
expensive in state A. Thus, if the two states engage 
in trade, state A will export labor-intensive goods 
and import capital-intensive goods, and nation B 
will export capital-intensive goods and import labor-
intensive goods. This pattern of trade will occur until 
wages and the marginal product of capital equalize 
across the two countries, and the respective prices for 
the two types of goods are the same on both sides of 
the border.131
The Stolper-Samuelson model can be applied 
to analyze trade between China and Central Asia. 
In general, China is relatively rich in capital and 
labor, and relatively scarce in natural resources (oil, 
gas, and certain minerals). Central Asian states, in 
contrast, are relatively abundant in natural resources, 
but relatively scarce in capital and labor. This means 
that when trade opened between the two states, 
China would be expected to export capital-and labor-
intensive goods to Central Asia (such as machinery 
or manufactured goods) and import natural 
resources, while the reverse would occur in Central 
Asian states. As demonstrated in section IV, this is 
precisely what occurred. 
Understanding the reactions to investment in 
Xinjiang and Central Asia requires an analysis of 
the various interest groups involved and how they 
are affected. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem can 
be used to analyze how domestic constituencies 
are likely to react to the opening of trade. Ronald 
Rogowski, a professor at UCLA, created a model for 
the political implications of the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem by examining the types of domestic conflicts 
likely to arise from trade. Rogowski considers how 
a state’s relative abundance or scarcity in different 
combinations of three factors of production—land, 
capital, and labor—can lead to rural–urban conflict 
or class conflict.132
The version of Rogowski’s model that most 
closely parallels the situation faced by Central Asian 
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nations in their economic relationships with China 
is one in which capital and labor are scarce and 
land is abundant (in this case, mineral and energy 
resources should be substituted for land, although 
land deals between China and Central Asia have 
been proposed). The distribution of the factors 
of production in Xinjiang is similar, although the 
situation differs because the economic relationship 
is domestic. Rogowski argues that this scenario will 
lead to rural–urban conflict because capital and labor 
tend to be concentrated in urban areas and land in 
rural areas.133 
In Central Asia, however, since the abundant 
natural resource is not land but rather mineral and 
energy resources, the type of conflict that will occur 
differs. The most likely form of conflict is between 
those groups with stakes in the energy industry 
(often the elite in Central Asia and state-owned 
enterprises in Xinjiang) and those engaged in capital- 
and labor-intensive sectors such as manufacturing 
and retail. Those working in capital- and labor-
intensive sectors may come to resent China’s role 
in the economy because Chinese imports threaten 
their own products and jobs. Those in the resource 
sector, however, will welcome Chinese investment. 
The effect of these class cleavages in Central Asia and 
Xinjiang following the implementation of new trade 
and development policies is discussed in section VI.
As predicted by the models above, much of 
the opposition to trade in Central Asia comes from 
lower-skilled workers engaged in manufacturing 
and in the selling of goods at bazaars rather than 
from the elite.134 This response is also consistent 
with the finding that low-skilled workers tend to be 
more protectionist.135 Additionally, factors outside 
of economic interests may inform opposition to 
Chinese trade in Central Asia. Foreign policy and 
antagonistic sentiments toward a particular nation 
based on history have been found to negatively 
affect a population’s attitudes towards opening 
trade.136 During the Soviet era, there was significant 
propaganda in Central Asian societies critiquing 
China, and some negative attitudes linger today.137 
Thus, in the case of China and Central Asia, 
suspicions about the Chinese government’s intentions 
and ongoing resentment surrounding water disputes 
and land deals may also spill over into resistance to 
trade.138
b. The Effects of Migration 
Another concern surrounding increased 
investment in both Central Asia and Xinjiang has 
been an accompanying increase in migration. In 
Central Asia, this concern relates to migration from 
all parts of China, while in Xinjiang, the concern 
relates specifically to Han Chinese migration into 
the province. Early on, many of the traders that 
migrated through Xinjiang to Central Asia were 
Uighurs engaged in the shuttle trade. However, the 
influence of Han merchants has grown substantially 
and the number of Uighur traders has declined.139 
There is now estimated to be a roughly even divide 
of Chinese migrants to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
who are either Han Chinese or ethnically Central 
Asian. 140 Yet shared ethnicity does not necessarily 
make the receiving Central Asian populations more 
sympathetic, and some oppose the migration of 
Chinese Uighurs and Kazakhs as well. 141
The literature on individual attitudes towards 
migration and globalization can help explain 
the sources of these concerns. Professors Jens 
Hainmueller and Daniel Hopkins divide the sources 
of opposition to migration into two major categories: 
those that relate to political economy and those that 
relate to socio-psychological factors.142 Fears of both 
types are apparent in Xinjiang and Central Asia. 
Considering first the factors related to political 
economy, the labor market affects of migration 
should be analyzed. Extending the Stolper-Samuelson 
theory to migration suggests that trade and 
migration can act as substitutes for one another.143 
A nation with a relatively abundant labor supply 
can either export labor-intensive goods or can send 
migrants abroad to a state where labor is scarce. 
The eventual equilibration in wages will be the 
same.144 The arrival of Chinese workers brought in 
to complete infrastructure and energy projects in the 
less populous nations of Central Asia has sparked 
resentment because they are seen as replacing local 
laborers. Similarly, the negative attitudes toward Han 
Chinese migration into Xinjiang have arisen in part 
from fears of labor market substitution and the sense 
that Han migrants fill new jobs created by economic 
development.145 
In other scenarios, however, migration and 
trade are complements.146 This appears to be the 
case in certain types of migration between China 
and Central Asia. Migration acts as a complement 
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to trade in instances when the Chinese migrants 
are traders or businessmen and accompany goods 
produced in China and brought to Central Asia. 
A similar phenomenon has played out in Chinese 
trade with Africa, where some of the migrants are 
shopkeepers who establish small shops selling goods 
that they have imported from China.147 Thus, the 
opposition to Chinese goods in Central Asia is at 
times linked to opposition to migration, since they 
reflect two aspects of the same phenomenon. 
Outside the labor market, there are also 
concerns about the cultural and political effects of 
Chinese immigration. Hainmueller and Hopkins 
report that recent studies have shown “that 
immigration-related attitudes are driven by symbolic 
concerns about the nation as a whole,” which can 
be either cultural or economic.148 With migration, 
individuals may worry not only about their own 
wages and labor market outcomes, but also about the 
social effects of migrants.149 For instance, in Central 
Asia, concern over the social impact of Chinese 
traders changing the character of bazaars may 
compound individual fears. Misrepresentations of the 
Chinese migrant population in Central Asia due to “a 
lack of consistent data assessing the true magnitude 
of Chinese in-migration” have also been used by 
journalists and political figures to fuel xenophobia.150 
This is consistent with the finding that opposition 
to migration rises in relation to misperceptions 
of the number of migrants in a country and their 
visibility.151 
c. Trade as a Means to Promote Cooperation 
While the models above discuss ways in which 
disagreements over trade policy can arise, China’s 
investment policies, both foreign and domestic, also 
relate to discussions of whether trade can facilitate 
peaceful cooperation. Debate on this subject dates 
back to the work of Immanuel Kant, who argued in 
the first supplement of Of the Guarantee for Perpetual 
Peace that mutual interest as demonstrated by trade 
is a powerful force in uniting nations. He wrote, 
“The spirit of commerce, which is incompatible with 
war, sooner or later gains the upper hand in every 
state.” Then, by trading and engaging in financial 
transactions, states ultimately develop an inclination 
to pursue peace and mediate emerging conflicts with 
one another.152 Following this logic, as long as trade 
remains a primary basis of the relationship between 
China and Central Asian nations, there will be little 
incentive for either side to engage in behaviors that 
would disrupt this positive financial relationship. 
Thus, by increasing trade ties with Central Asia, 
China should be able to promote a common interest 
in regional stability and ensure cooperation on 
security issues. The government’s policies indicate 
a belief in this approach. However, trade and 
investment can also give rise to new sources of 
friction, as demonstrated in the sections below.
VII.  ATTITUDES TOWARD CHINA’S ROLE IN 
CENTRAL ASIA
Since one aim of Chinese economic 
involvement in Central Asia is promoting stability, it 
is important to consider if and when China’s polices 
actually increase, not reduce, tensions. In Central 
Asia, the economic situation has been the primary 
impetus for the creation of both pro-China and 
anti-China groups.153 In this section, theories for 
reactions toward Chinese trade, investment, and 
migration are compared to empirical evidence of 
responses to China’s growing economic role in the 
region. This analysis informs an understanding not 
only of the effect of previous Chinese investment, but 
also of the aspects of the New Silk Road that might 
prove the most controversial. 
a. General Views
Central Asian leaders have generally welcomed 
Chinese investment and discussed the potential 
for China to play a special role in each of their 
countries.154 China represents not only a significant 
source of investment but also an alternative to the 
traditional superpowers in the region, Russia and 
the United States.155 China is also an attractive 
investor because it rarely imposes political conditions 
on its loans, particularly appealing to Central 
Asian autocrats. Islam Karimov, the president of 
Uzbekistan, said, “In 22 years of bilateral relations 
between Uzbekistan and China, the latter has never 
set any political demands.”156 
Private economic interests underlie many 
of the positive attitudes Central Asian elites have 
toward China. Many elites have personal stakes in 
companies or sectors of the economy that benefit 
from investment from China, such as the oil 
sector.157 As predicted by the models of trade-related 
class cleavages, such groups are more likely to be 
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supportive of China’s growing influence. The Chinese 
government and companies have also sought to 
generate positive impressions through the use of soft 
power.158 
However, not all support among Central 
Asian citizens for a greater Chinese role in the 
region is based solely on a desire to benefit from 
current economic opportunities. Among younger 
generations, some see China as presenting a new 
and appealing development model and thus favor 
engagement as a way to mimic that model in their 
own nations and to help improve national financial 
conditions.159 Moreover, the decrease in oil prices 
during the winter of 2015 caused both energy 
revenues and remittances sent back to Central Asia 
from workers in Russia to decline. When these 
two important contributors to their economies 
fell, Central Asians may have begun to look more 
favorably on Chinese investment in the region as 
a way to balance against turmoil in other investor 
nations.160
While many Central Asian leaders express 
positive views of China, these views are often 
motivated more by economic need than a genuine 
belief in China’s good intentions.161 Indeed, 
opposition parties in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
have used anti-China sentiments as an important 
part of their platforms. Once in government, 
however, these parties often change course because 
“in view of the large economic, political, and 
demographic differential, no Central Asian regime 
can afford to present itself as Sinophobe.”162 During 
the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, many 
opposition leaders heavily criticized China and 
accused the sitting president, Askar Akayev, of 
being too concessionary toward China. However, 
when the opposition eventually came to power, they 
again established positive relations with the Chinese 
government.163
While there is no regional consensus toward 
China, the sense that trade will bring economic 
benefits is often mixed with feelings of resentment 
and suspicion.164 The director of the Central Asian 
Studies Center at KIMEP University in Kazakhstan, 
Nargis Kassenova, stated, “China is too powerful, too 
strong, and we’re afraid of being overwhelmed.” He 
added, “It’s hard to turn down on [sic] what China 
can offer, but we resist the full embrace of Chinese 
power.”165 Populations in many other Asian nations, 
even those that have deep economic ties with China, 
echo these concerns. Economic dependence is 
likely to further increase as a result of the New Silk 
Road, but if nations do try to resist China’s “full 
embrace,” it could reduce future political and security 
cooperation. 
The degree to which citizens of Central 
Asian states express anti-China sentiments varies 
depending on the level of media and political 
freedom. In general, the more open countries, such 
as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, report 
the highest levels of opposition to China in domestic 
polls.166 In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the 
media repeatedly refers to a “China lobby” linked to 
their countries’ “economic woes and policy errors of 
the government.”167 In the more authoritarian states 
of Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, however, violent 
anti-China incidents have not occurred.168
b. Concern that the Economic Relationship Is 
Imbalanced
 The populations of many Central Asian 
states express concern that their states’ economic 
relationships with China are increasingly imbalanced 
and overly reliant on extractive industries. 
This sentiment is most frequently voiced in 
Kazakhstan.169 More than 85 percent of exports from 
Central Asia to China are natural resources and raw 
materials, while more than 85 percent of the products 
sold by Chinese companies are manufactured 
items.170 Due to the large share of Kazakh oil that 
Chinese energy firms own, some in Kazakhstan 
worry that their country will gradually become 
simply a “raw materials appendage” of China.171 
The secretary-general of Kazakhstan’s opposition 
Green Party, Serikzhan Mambetalin, said, “The whole 
economy of Kazakhstan is based on producing crude 
oil, selling it for US dollars and using these dollars to 
buy cheap Chinese products. There is no industry in 
this country apart from the extractive industry.”172
c. Attitudes toward Chinese Goods
 One of the largest tensions in the Sino-Central 
Asian economic relationship is the effect of Chinese 
manufactured goods on local markets. Chinese 
products, which constitute between 80 and 90 
percent of exports to the region, trigger resentment 
because they are often cheaper than those made 
domestically and are seen as contributing to high 
levels of local unemployment.173 In recent years, 
a large number of Chinese goods have arrived in 
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Central Asian bazaars and provoked discontent 
among local traders.174 The director of a Kyrgyz 
market research firm decried the effects of Chinese 
goods in local markets in an article in EurasiaNet. 
He explained that because Kyrgyzstan had become 
so dependent on Chinese imports, the economy was 
subject to more volatility because Chinese goods 
were considered to be of poor quality: “We cannot 
be sure of the quality of the food and household 
products entering our market, because traders tend 
to buy from the lower spectrum of Chinese goods. 
Much trade with China is contraband and this can 
impact the health of the population.”175 The arrival of 
Chinese goods, whether contraband or legal, is likely 
to accelerate with the improved transportation routes 
of the New Silk Road. 
In Kazakhstan, significant concern surrounds 
the effects of Chinese manufactured goods on 
local industrial capacities. Since its independence, 
Kazakhstan has had a weak manufacturing base; the 
costs of production in the country are estimated to 
be five times the costs in China. Thus, even though 
the opening of trade has benefited the national 
economy overall, individuals in certain sectors, 
such as textiles, have been harmed, as the Stolper-
Samuelson model would predict regarding the types 
of goods traded between countries with different 
initial factors of production.176 In some areas, loosely 
formed groups of opposition emerged in response to 
anxiety surrounding the Chinese presence in local 
markets. Consistent with the effects discussed in the 
Rogowski model on who opposes and supports the 
opening of trade, these groups have emerged largely 
among “working middle-class people, concerned 
about Chinese competition and the deterioration of 
the labor market.”177 However, restricting Chinese 
products from entering the Kazakh market might 
prove difficult. More than half of the small businesses 
in Kazakhstan trade with China.178 Konstantin 
Syroezhkin of the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic 
Studies said, “We have no alternative. If we were to 
eliminate Chinese products we would end up facing a 
severe deficit of products in the market.” 179
Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan, opposition has 
also developed toward goods and traders from 
China. A group representing 10,000 merchants 
and storeowners at Kyrgyzstan’s Karasuu Bazaar 
has repeatedly criticized Chinese competition and 
organized protests.180 More violent acts have also 
occurred. In one incident in 2010, a violent mob 
attacked Kyrgyzstan’s Guoying shopping center, 
which is owned by a Chinese company.181 Not all 
Kyrgyz are critical of the Chinese goods arriving 
in their country, however, and a Kyrgyz customs 
inspector told the Economist, “There is demand for 
them in our country, so I suppose these goods must 
be okay.”182
The New Silk Road initiative will likely increase 
the number of Chinese goods arriving in Central 
Asia. The initiative focuses on reducing barriers 
to market access created by poor infrastructure, 
tariffs, and customs practices, but not on improving 
local manufacturing capabilities. Thus, many of the 
concerns discussed above should be expected to 
increase rather than to be alleviated.
d. Attitudes toward Chinese Migrants 
Transportation routes affiliated with the 
New Silk Road will facilitate the movement not 
only of goods but also of people. The reactions to 
Chinese migration in Central Asia are an important 
manifestation of China’s regional image. Migration 
associated with Chinese infrastructure projects and 
trade is a global phenomenon. A particular concern 
in Central Asia is the perception that Chinese 
migrants are sent abroad to cultivate influence 
over local populations. Rustam Haidarov, a Tajik 
sociologist, said, “It is China’s strategy to resettle its 
people in different countries.” He added his belief 
that the Chinese first gain influence in economic 
spheres and then transfer that influence into political 
spheres. His statements reflect the high degree of 
suspicion surrounding Chinese migration in Central 
Asia. A report published by the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies in 2003 argued that while 
Central Asian states were worried about Chinese 
migration, it was difficult for them to object because 
they needed economic and security assistance.183 The 
phenomenon remains true today. 
The presence of Chinese traders and other 
migrants is particularly visible in poorer Central 
Asian nations, such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
Strong opposition to Chinese migrants exists in 
these states since “an upsurge of Chinese laborers 
has escalated competition with local communities 
for jobs in mining, agriculture, construction, trade 
and transportation.” 184 As more Chinese enterprises 
have been established, domestic frustrations have 
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grown. Between 2002 and 2010, multiple arson 
attacks occurred in the Chinese and Uighur areas 
of Kyrgyz bazaars, although it was unclear whether 
these fires could be fully attributed to ethnic and 
national tensions.185 In Tajikistan, the number of 
Chinese workers rose from 30,000 to 82,000 between 
2007 and 2010.186 In general, these laborers work 
for large Chinese companies and do not interact 
much with the local population; however, as the 
number of migrants has grown, occasional spates of 
violence between Chinese laborers and Tajik citizens 
have increased.187 Incidents in both states reflect 
opposition to migration arising from fears related to 
labor market substitution. 
The Kyrgyz government has considered 
restricting migration but has not done so, out of 
fear for China’s reaction. In April 2007, the Kyrgyz 
government proposed restricting the number of 
foreigners that could engage in wholesale and retail 
trade, going so far as to issue a directive to limit 
the number of foreign traders at Kyrgyz bazaars to 
4,500 (for comparison, as early as 2003, there were 
20,000 Chinese traders present).188 An explicit aim 
of the directive was to minimize competition arising 
from Chinese merchants. That year, however, the 
SCO summit was hosted by Kyrgyzstan, and the 
government worried about the negative impact this 
directive might have on relations with Beijing. It 
was thus never put into force.189 Nonetheless, some 
Kyrgyz would still like their government to pressure 
China to restrict migration. Others, however, see 
Chinese traders as positively contributing to the 
Kyrgyz economy through the re-export market, 
payment of rents, and provision of cheap goods to 
Kyrgyz consumers. 190 
Chinese migration in Kazakhstan is less 
controversial than in poorer states, but it is still 
a point of concern. Due to the energy-focused 
relationship between China and Kazakhstan, most 
of the Chinese migrants in the country are engineers 
and construction workers.191 Kazakhstan has put in 
place some mechanisms to control Chinese migration 
and limit social unrest, including monitoring visas 
and mandates for the hiring of a certain number of 
Kazakh employees.192 Such laws, however, are not 
always enforced. Even when they are, reports indicate 
that local employees receive reduced wages and are 
assigned more challenging jobs.193 Protests regarding 
the treatment of workers at a China Petroleum 
Engineering and Construction Corporation site in 
Kazakhstan occurred in 2007. During this time, the 
Chinese were criticized in local media “as exploiters 
of the Kazakh people.”194 Although Kazakhstan 
receives fewer migrants from China than from 
Central Asian states, Chinese laborers are perceived 
as contributing to high local unemployment. In 
particular, the risk of a “Yellow Peril,” has been raised 
in both the Kazakh parliament and press, which 
reflects the cultural and ethnic sources of opposition 
to migration.195 
VIII. HOW MIGHT THE NEW SILK ROAD BE 
RECEIVED IN CENTRAL ASIA?
a. Political Responses to Chinese Investment 
The above analysis of the reaction to Chinese 
investment in Central Asia suggests that the Chinese 
government may encounter opposition to an increase 
in its regional economic presence unless it can show 
that its actions will benefit other nations, and it 
will not merely extract resources for use in its own 
economy.196 Inclusiveness will thus be critical to 
the New Silk Road’s design.197 Gao Huacheng, the 
Chinese commerce minister, sees the program as in 
the interest of all nations. He said, “We believe the 
initiatives will not only facilitate China’s growth, but 
also boost economies along the route as well as the 
world.” 198 The Director of the Institute for Central 
Asian Studies at Lanzhou University, Yang Shu, 
however, believes that based on current plans for the 
New Silk Road, “It looks like China is building it and 
asking others to tag along.”199 
While in general Central Asian leaders have 
welcomed the New Silk Road, some domestic 
opposition could still arise. The president of 
Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, has stated that 
the project is “a wonderful concept,” and “solidarity 
will be our strength to develop regional cooperation 
along the Silk Road.”200 Such optimistic statements, 
however, may belie past realities. Rafaello Pantucci, 
the director of international security studies at the 
Royal United Services Institute, has said that due to 
investment from the New Silk Road, “The Kazakh 
government might find they have political anger at 
home toward the Chinese investment…If you got 
huge public anger to confront, you’ve got to respond 
to it.”201
 The anti-China sentiments expressed by 
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citizens in Central Asian nations pose a political 
problem for their governments, which are forced 
to balance demands from China with those from 
domestic constituencies.202 Agreements with China 
can lead local populations not only to criticize the 
Chinese entities involved, but also to question the 
strength and intentions of their own governments.203 
For instance, citizens have repeatedly raised the 
concern that Kazakhstan will eventually be forced 
to cede oil and land to China in order to pay off 
loans.204 
Rather than finding ways to make Chinese 
presence more palatable, the Kazakh government 
has sometimes conceded to domestic anger. When 
China sought to lease one million hectares of land 
from Kazakhstan in 2009, protests were so strong 
that the deal was canceled. Political opposition to 
Chinese influence in Kazakhstan also thwarted a 
free trade agreement between the two states.205 The 
political opposition toward some Chinese investment 
in Kazakhstan has led Laruelle and Peyrouse to 
argue that despite the large stake that China has 
in Kazakhstan’s oil sector, “Chinese control over 
Kazakh oil is not established.”206 Indeed, the Kazakh 
Minister of Oil and Gas stated in September 2013, 
“that China’s share of the domestic oil and natural 
gas production will drop from 24 percent to 7-8 
percent.”207 This statement runs counter to the 
spirit of cooperation normally expressed by Kazakh 
officials toward economic deals with China. Future 
political opposition of this sort could hinder the 
proposed expansion in energy partnerships under 
the New Silk Road and force governments to limit 
new deals. Additionally, the more that working with 
China is considered to be a sign of governmental 
weakness, the less likely future cooperation may 
become.
b. Regional Security Implications of the New Silk 
Road 
The New Silk Road has also been explicitly 
linked to China’s security interests in the region.208 It 
ties into China’s previous pattern of using economic 
incentives as a means for ensuring greater political 
and security cooperation. Over the past decade, 
China has been able to successfully use its bilateral 
economic relationships to encourage repression of 
Uighur activities by Central Asian governments and 
expand on previous political efforts.209 The World 
Uighur Congress, a collection of Uighur groups, 
reports that between 2001 and 2011, approximately 
fifty Uighurs in Kyrgyzstan were extradited to 
China.210 In more recent economic agreements, the 
parties involved have again stated their willingness to 
confront Uighur terrorism. 211
The deals in the New Silk Road may include 
additional provisions to address security and 
promote China’s regional agenda. Regional terrorism 
is a genuine concern, and the rise of the Islamic 
State has increased fears. In the same speech in 
which President Xi announced the New Silk Road 
initiative in Kazakhstan in 2013, he also argued 
that the participating nations should cooperate 
with one another on topics including “sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and security, while cracking 
down on the ‘evil forces’ of terrorism, extremism and 
separatism.”212 As Central Asian nations become 
even more indebted to China due to loans provided 
under the New Silk Road, they may have no choice 
but to accept new security provisions.213 However, 
while building relationships with Central Asian 
nations has generally proved an effective means for 
China to suppress Uighur political organizing, there 
is also a risk that by reinforcing Xinjiang’s position 
as an economic gateway to Central Asia, greater 
political and religious affiliations between the two 
regions may emerge.214 
 The security interests involved in the New 
Silk Road initiative are further underscored by 
the support that it has received from members of 
the Chinese military. Major General Ji Mingkui 
of the People’s Liberation Army is one of the most 
prominent military officials to support the New Silk 
Road. He stated that it will provide an opportunity 
for the SCO to further collaborate on security 
issues as well as economic development. Colonel 
Bao Shixiu has also argued that with the initiative, 
China is “ready to share its [economic] opportunities 
with [its] neighbors,” but “at the same time, it 
needs their cooperation in addressing problems 
such as terrorism, cross-border crime and drug 
trafficking.”215 This is very similar to the rhetoric 
that surrounded China’s development of relations 
with Central Asian nations in the 1990s. The Chinese 
government appears to be building on past efforts 
to ensure the cooperation of Central Asian states 
on terrorism and separatism through economic 
development. However, Chinese leaders must also 
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remain attuned to how the initiative is perceived 
abroad if the deals are to succeed. 
IX. HOW MIGHT THE NEW SILK ROAD BE RE-
CEIVED IN XINJIANG?
Given the similarities between previous eco-
nomic development campaigns in Xinjiang and cer-
tain provisions in the New Silk Road, understanding 
the effects of past development is necessary to ana-
lyze how people will react to the New Silk Road. This 
section will use the models for individual reactions to 
trade and migration established in section IV as well 
as information on reactions to previous investment in 
Xinjiang to consider what implications the New Silk 
Road will have for the province. 
a. Previous Reactions to Economic Development 
Despite the emphasis that the Chinese govern-
ment has placed on development initiatives as a pan-
acea for interethnic tensions and promoting social 
stability in Xinjiang, these initiatives have encoun-
tered obstacles. More specifically, the Uighur popula-
tion has felt marginalized by the arrival of Han mi-
grants and unequal distribution of opportunities.216 
The government sees Han migration into Xinjiang 
as a method for integrating the province and “bring-
ing investment, educated labor, and droves of loyal 
citizens to the troubled and resource-rich region.”217 
When the People’s Republic of China was founded 
in 1949, there were just 220,000 Han Chinese in the 
province and members of China’s ethnic minorities 
comprised a majority of the population.218 Migration 
intensified with the incentive of new employment 
prospects created through development.219 By 1990, 
the Han population in Xinjiang was 5.32 million 
(37.6 percent of the population), by 2000, it was 7.49 
million (40.6 percent), and by 2010, it was 8.4 million 
(39 percent).220 Most migrants have gone to Xinji-
ang’s more industrialized north, particularly to the 
city of Urumqi, where Han Chinese now comprise 
more than three quarters of the population.221 
Han migrants are perceived as 
disproportionately benefiting from the economic 
development polices in Xinjiang. Economic 
integration between the province and the rest of 
China has led to the growth of Xinjiang’s energy 
sector, as would be predicted by the models in 
section IV since the province is relatively rich in 
resources. However, the accompanying benefits 
have not always gone to the local population. Since 
state-owned energy companies are not based in 
Xinjiang, a large portion of their profits return to 
other parts of China.222 Additionally, in Xinjiang’s 
oil industry, many of the managers and construction 
workers are Han Chinese.223 In other areas of the 
economy, Han Chinese have also displaced Uighurs. 
Cross-border barter trade with Central Asia was 
once largely organized by Uighurs, but is now led 
by Han merchants.224 Disparities in opportunity 
have resulted in high unemployment rates in the 
Uighur population, even among those who are well-
educated. Han Chinese migrants are often richer 
than Uighur residents and occupy higher-class 
positions.225 As of 2014, just 13 percent of Uighurs 
worked in managerial and professional positions 
compared to more than 35 percent of the employed 
Han population.226 While there are clear benefits 
from greater investment, it is consistent with the 
findings of the aforementioned models that because 
Uighurs tend to occupy lower-skilled positions they 
might have more reservations about opening their 
province to further investment.
In recent years, acts of Uighur-led hostility have 
increased not just in Xinjiang, but also in other parts 
of China. In October 2013, the East Turkestan Islamic 
Movement claimed responsibility for a car attack 
in Tiananmen Square. In March 2013, stabbings by 
Uighurs occurred at a railway station in the city of 
Kunming.227 In the wake of unrest, the “stick” of 
increased political, social, and religious restrictions 
has been paired with the “carrot” of economic 
development policies in Xinjiang.
 In this period of increased unrest, there 
remained a clear commitment to using economic 
development, including through the New Silk Road, 
to address tensions. A 2014 Xinhua article said that 
the best way of handling the current social issues was 
through “improving the quality of living for all ethnic 
groups through balanced development.”228 However, 
some also expressed skepticism about the continued 
use of development in Xinjiang. For example, 
Kendrick Kuo writes in Foreign Affairs, “Beijing’s 
drive to develop the region economically—in the face 
of an already resentful and restless minority—has 
failed to create stability there.”229 While improving 
standards of living in the province is a positive 
development, once residents achieve a certain level 
of economic security they may be able devote more 
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time to promoting and organizing around their 
ethnic identity. Thus, further development through 
the New Silk Road may not necessarily serve to 
improve relations in Xinjiang in the way the Chinese 
government might desire.230
b. Implications of the New Silk Road 
Analyzing the record of economic development 
campaigns in Xinjiang reveals a risk that despite 
the hopes that the New Silk Road will improve the 
province’s economy, it may ultimately provoke new 
frustrations among the Uighur population. The 
spokesman for the World Uighur Congress, Alim 
Seytoff, said, 
“The Chinese investment of $40 billion that 
Xi revealed is really bad news for the Uighur 
people…Chinese investment has not brought 
so-called prosperity, stability or peace for the 
indigenous Uighur people in East Turkestan. 
In light of the strategic importance of East 
Turkestan, which is a gateway to Central and 
South Asia for China, we have seen more of 
the repression Uighurs have faced over the past 
decade.”231
The network of trade routes that will run through 
Xinjiang as a result of the New Silk Road will make 
ensuring a stable environment in the province all the 
more important. The desire to maintain stability in 
turn could lead to increased restrictions on religious, 
political, and educational freedoms and fuel Uighur 
resentment. 
The effects of Chinese investment in Xinjiang 
have also raised doubts about Chinese investment 
in Central Asia; the New Silk Road may exacerbate 
these doubts. Kazakhstan’s first ambassador to 
China, Murat Auezov, said, “What is happening in 
Xinjiang is the building of a platform for the next 
leap forward into the Central Asian and Kazakh 
territory.”232 Central Asians worry that the pattern 
of Han migration that has occurred in Xinjiang will 
eventually expand into Central Asia.233 However, 
most experts do not think that the same level of 
migration will occur outside of Xinjiang.234
X. THE ETHICS OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
AND THE NEW SILK ROAD
 The New Silk Road will not only affect the 
political and economic situation in Xinjiang and 
Central Asia, but will also raise important consider-
ations regarding the ethics of economic development 
and trade. This section will give a brief overview of 
those considerations and how the Chinese govern-
ment has addressed them. 
China’s foreign investment strategies have 
been criticized as being “neo-colonial.” Such 
criticisms have largely been levied in the context 
of China’s involvement in Africa; however, similar 
critiques could be applied in Central Asia. In both 
regions, China’s investment is largely focused 
on the extraction of resources and building the 
infrastructure necessary to do so. An economy 
can be considered “neo-colonial” when it is “…
geared toward the promotion of the interests of 
foreign capital that dominates a particular location.” 
235 As China’s role in Kazakhstan’s oil sector and 
Kyrgyzstan’s re-export market has grown, the 
economies of both Central Asian nations have 
become increasingly geared towards an outside 
power. However, neo-colonial or neo-imperial 
endeavors also often include the imposition of values 
on another nation. This is something that China 
explicitly avoids in its public statements and in fact 
part of appeal of its investment to other nations. 
While arguments about neo-colonialism can draw 
attention to some worrisome aspects of China’s 
policies, it is hyperbolic to suggest that with the 
New Silk Road China is becoming a “neo-colonial” 
power. China is engaging in activities beneficial to its 
domestic economy and international status, but these 
actions are not designed to subsume the existing 
political or cultural systems in the nations in which it 
trades or invests. 
Additionally, countries subject to “neo-
colonialism” often lack an alternative partner 
besides the dominant nation. This is clearly not the 
case in Central Asia where local governments have 
played Russia, China, and the United States against 
one another in both the political and economic 
spheres.236 Moreover, other Asian nations now 
appear to be increasing their focus on Central Asia. 
Japanese President Shinzo Abe visited five Central 
Asian states in October 2015 and emphasized 
opportunities for trade with Japan.237 Under Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi, who also visited all five 
states in 2015, India has begun to expand the 
“Connect Central Asia” policy begun in 2012 and to 
pursue trade and resource agreements with Central 
Asia.238 Central Asian states clearly will not lack 
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for outside partners even if the Russian economy 
remains weak and U.S. involvement in the region 
declines. While China still retains a dominant 
economic position in the region, the increased 
competition from other nations may lead China to 
pursue policies that have broader appeal to local 
populations. 
Accusations of neo-colonialism have been 
explicitly made regarding Chinese economic 
development programs in Xinjiang. While there 
is a clear economic rationale for the government’s 
investment in the region, these programs have raised 
concerns about distributive justice and the effects of 
development on local customs.239 For instance, the 
“Develop the West” campaign project was billed as 
bringing more “civilization” to the province, but also 
contributed to the weakening of regional culture. 
One instance of this was the razing of large sections 
of the old city of Kashgar, located in southern 
Xinjiang, to make room for new buildings.240 
Some types of “civilization” were thus privileged 
above others. The government’s encouragement of 
Chinese migration and of Han-Uighur intermarriage, 
and discouragement of Uighur women wearing 
headscarves all raise similar concerns about cultural 
and demographic dilution and the imposition of 
outside values on the region’s population.241
The Chinese government has begun to 
recognize that some policy changes must be made 
to ensure that issues of justice do not undermine 
its development program in Xinjiang. During a 
visit to the province in April 2015, President Xi 
indicated that the focus of development would 
shift toward “labor-intensive industries, agriculture 
industrialization and other traditional local 
industries,” in order to promote the employment 
of Uighurs and ensure greater equality of 
opportunity.242 Editorials in the Chinese state media 
have also expressed a greater degree of recognition 
that economic development alone cannot solve the 
challenges in Xinjiang and that even with continued 
development, the benefits will need to be more 
evenly distributed. 243 Similar recognition of the need 
for inclusive development will be required to reduce 
ethical concerns surrounding the New Silk Road. 
XI. CONCLUSION
 The New Silk Road builds on ideas, 
including reducing conflict through economic 
relations that have previously guided the Chinese 
government’s development policies in Xinjiang 
and its trade and investment policies in Central 
Asia. The Chinese government continues to view 
economic engagement with Central Asia as a tool 
for reducing ethnic tensions and unrest in Xinjiang, 
promoting regional stability by strengthening 
the economies of surrounding nations, gaining 
access to overland energy resources, and opening 
new markets. However, resentment toward the 
Chinese government’s polices has also arisen. In 
Xinjiang, local concerns center on Han migration 
and the unequal distribution of the benefits from 
development. In Central Asia, domestic concerns 
center on the extractive nature of the economic 
relationship, the effect of Chinese goods on local 
industries, and the arrival of Chinese merchants 
and laborers. The New Silk Road will bring a further 
increase in the construction of infrastructure, 
reduction of trade barriers, and growth in China’s 
regional economic clout, all of which may exacerbate 
these grievances. Nonetheless, given the power 
imbalance between China and its neighboring 
states and the ability of the autocratic Central Asian 
governments to suppress domestic frustration are 
large, it is unlikely that any of the grievances outlined 
above will derail the New Silk Road policies. 
The implementation of these policies will likely be 
more effective if past reactions to trade and invest-
ment are considered and used to design more inclu-
sive policies. The Chinese government has repeatedly 
articulated the belief that the project should benefit 
all parties. A government framing document stated 
that the initiative must be “jointly built through con-
sultation to meet the interests of all.”244 Moreover, 
Chinese foreign policy experts already recognize the 
importance of making the plan more inclusive. Shi 
Yinhong, a professor at Renmin University, wrote, 
“It’s vital to fully engage the countries on whose 
sovereign lands the infrastructure systems are to be 
built, and this includes conducting far more inter-
national consultations than has been the case up to 
now.”245 Concrete actions, however, are necessary to 
demonstrate consideration of these joint interests. 
The Chinese government should highlight the ways 
that the “one belt, one road” initiative can contribute 
to economic diversification and employment in Cen-
tral Asian nations. Some analysts already see shifting 
patterns of Chinese investment in Central Asia away 
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from the resource sector and toward tourism, farm-
ing, and other industries.246 Some of these sectors, 
particularly tourism, would provide more opportuni-
ties for domestic development. Additionally, increas-
ing efforts to hire local workers might quell some of 
the unrest regarding unemployment. Otherwise, a 
failure to engage with regional concerns may hamper 
some of the grand ambitions for the New Silk Road. 
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